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Abstract. In this paper we present three formal performance models,
using PEPA, for three types of misbehaving voters when using the DRE-i
e-voting system. We use the constructed performance models to study
the impact of the intervention of misbehaving voters on the throughput
of four main actions of the DRE-i e-voting system. Our performance anal-
ysis reveals that the three types of misbehaving voters have a negative
impact on the throughput of the DRE-i server actions.
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1 Introduction
E-voting systems face a wide range of potential misbehaving components or
agents beyond what we used to have in traditional elections. These misbehaviours
include misconfigured e-voting components [23, 15], errors made by voters, and
malicious behaviours made by attackers [16]. Some known attacks on e-voting
systems include the replay attack [6], man in the middle attacks, and Cross-
Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forging (CSRF) attacks [7, 19].
Investigating the impact of these misbehaviours on e-voting systems performance
is an intriguing research topic. One way of studying this impact is through
constructing the misbehaving voters’ formal performance models and evaluating
how their interventions with e-voting system may affect the performance of the
e-voting system.
PEPA (Performance Evaluation Process Algebra) [13] is a well-known formal-
ism in constructing performance models for concurrent systems and communica-
tion protocols [9, 22]. In [2], a formal performance model for the casting-verifying
stage of the DRE-i e-voting scheme [11] was constructed using PEPA. In this
study, we will model three types of misbehaving voters and their interactions
with the DRE-i system using the same formalism. The constructed performance
models will be analysed using performance evaluation techniques built in PEPA
Eclipse Plug-in [21] to have an insight on the effect of misbehaving voters on the
performance of the DRE-i server.
Next, we will provide a brief background about e-voting systems and PEPA.
In the third section, we will describe our approach in modelling the misbehaving
voters and analysing their impact on the DRE-i e-voting system. Performance
models will be shown in section four, and in section five we will present the result
and discussion. Finally, conclusion and future work will be presented in section
six.
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2 Background
In this section, we will provide a brief background about PEPA (For more details
about PEPA, please refer to [13]) and e-Voting schemes (Refer to [10, 12] for more
details). Also, we will briefly present some known misbehaviours that could affect
e-voting systems. At the end of this section, we will present the work related to
modelling and analysing e-voting schemes using formal performance models such
as PEPA.
2.1 e-Voting
An election enables a participant to choose his candidate for holding a posi-
tion in a public or private organisation by the voting process. To increase the
turnout of voters in elections, researchers suggested electronic voting systems
that meet strict accuracy and security requirements. Well-known examples of
e-voting systems include DRE-i [11], Helios [1], and iVote [5]. Many countries,
states, and organizations have used the e-voting systems in elections such as
Estonia [17], Brazil, India, the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) [5],
and the International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR)[3]. Electronic
voting security literature identifies many security requirements for e-voting pro-
tocols such as completeness, privacy, soundness and robustness, receipt-freeness,
verifiability, fairness, eligibility, and unreusability. To achieve these security fea-
tures, the electronic voting schemes use different cryptographic building blocks
which include blind signatures, mix-nets, encryption algorithms, and interactive
and non-interactive proofs.
2.2 e-Voting Misbehaviours
Security of e-voting systems is very influential in the democratic process so many
researchers have studied the possible attacks against e-voting systems [12, 16].
One of the attacks is the replay attack where a malicious voter retransmits a
valid vote or message. The vote replay attack was discovered in different e-voting
schemes such as Helios 2.0 [6] and the e-voting schemes by Sako & Kilian and
Schoenmakers [18]. Another attack is based on compromising the web-interface
of the e-voting client using for example XSS (Coss-Site Scripting) or CSRF
(Cross-Site Request Forgery) attacks. In [7] the malicious voter can install a
malicious browser extension on the voter’s machine to compromise Helios 2.0 e-
voting system. Using the CSRF approaches [19], the malicious voter may exploit
a weakness in the e-voting web interface and establish an authenticated session
with the e-voting server to exchange voting messages with the server.
2.3 Introduction to PEPA
PEPA (Performance Evaluation Process Algebra) is a stochastic modelling for-
malism for constructing performance models for concurrent systems [13]. It was
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successfully used in modelling and analysing the performance aspects of sys-
tems and protocols. Performance models constructed by PEPA can help sys-
tems designers to evaluate the performance characteristics of the system to be
deployed. The performance attributes (such as throughput, queue-length, and re-
sponse time) of models constructed by PEPA can by analysed using Continuous-
Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) ap-
proaches. When using CTMC, the construction and evaluation of PEPA models
will be restricted by the size and complexity of modelled systems. PEPA model
will encounter the state-space explosion problem when the model comprises a
large number of components. To overcome the state-space problem, a fluid ap-
proximation approach has been suggested [14] to represent the PEPA model’s
underlying CTMC as a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). PEPA is
an abstract compositional description formalism which is used for constructing
performance models as a number of interacting components that process activ-
ities with rates. In a PEPA model, activity rate is an exponentially distributed
random number that shows the rate at which the activity (action) happens dur-
ing the execution of the model. To evaluate the performance of the PEPA model,
the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in tool [21] is used to edit and test the model. It is also
used to derive the model’s underlying CTMC and the ODE approximation of
the model’s CTMC. The derived CTMC and ODEs can be solved by the tool
to extract the model’s performance measures such as expected response time,
throughput and utilisation.
The syntax of PEPA language is composed of combinators that express the
behaviours and interactions of the model’s components. The following is the set
of PEPA language’s combinators:
Prefix The prefix combinator “.”designates the first behaviour undertaken
by the component. The action type α and rate r for component P is encoded in
PEPA as (α, r ).P which means the action will be carried out and then behaves
as component P.
Constant The constant combinator def= assigns names to behaviours (com-
ponents). For example, Q def= (α, r).P represents the assignment of the behaviour
of (α, r).P to the component Q.
Cooperation The combinator “./ L”represents the interactions between
components. The (P ./L Q) indicates the cooperation between components P
and Q over action types in the cooperation set L. The two components P and
Q will proceed independently and concurrently when their cooperation set L is
empty. In this case, the parallel composition of P and Q will be expressed as P ||
Q .
Choice The choice combinator “+”denotes the competition between be-
haviours. P+Q represents a system that may behave as P or Q.
Hiding The hiding combinator “/”hides the activities in the set L and
considers them as an internal delay inside the component. The P/L makes the
activities in set L as the unknown type τ where the external observer can witness
the delay caused by the hidden activity τ. However, the external observer can
not access the hidden activity.
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2.4 Related Work
PEPA performance models for the voting scheme of Fujioka, Okamoto, and
Ohta [8] was constructed and evaluated in [20, 4].In [20], a set of PEPA models
constructed and analysed for reliable and unreliable voters. In [4], a stochastic
simulation technique was used to convert a PEPA model of an e-voting scheme
to a set of rate equations. Each rate equation represented an individual action
of a component inside the PEPA model and by using these rate equations a
simulation description file was constructed that fitted the Dizzy simulation tool.
Therefore, the PEPA model of the e-voting scheme was simulated and analysed
for a large number of voters. Moreover, the DRE-i e-voting scheme was modelled
by PEPA in [2]. The constructed model was evaluated using CTMC and ODEs
approaches for a varying number of voters to evaluate the voters’ response time
when they get involved in the cast-verify stage during the election day.
3 Our Approach
During the election day, legitimate voters who prefer using e-voting systems will
use their electronic devices to join election and cast their votes. This usually
will lead to an increase in the throughput of the main activities in the e-voting
system. With the intervention of misbehaving voters with the e-voting system,
the throughput that is dedicated for legitimate voters will be challenged. We
are interested in evaluating the impact of the rate and depth of the intervention
of misbehaving voters with the e-voting system. Theretofore, in this section we
will present the PEPA models for the DRE-i e-voting server and client, and
the three types of misbehaving voters. Also, we will present the rates for the
models’ actions, and finally we will explain how to evaluate the impact of the
misbehaving voters on the DRE-i e-voting system.
3.1 DRE-i Behaviour description
The Direct Recording Electronic with integrity e-voting scheme (DRE-i) was
presented by Hao et al. [11]. The scheme is an end-to-end verifiable and self-
enforcing cryptographic voting scheme based on the Direct Recording Electronic
voting systems which replaces the tallying authority with a cryptographic ho-
momorphic tallying algorithm. The DRE-i scheme can be used in controlled or
uncontrolled voting environment for large-scale country-wide political elections
or small-size elections like university students’ union elections. In this e-voting
scheme, a tamper-resistant security module of the e-voting server will gener-
ate for each eligible voter n ballots. Each ballot will have two encrypted values
known as cryptograms. During election stage, the voter needs to prove his eli-
gibility for voting and identity to the voting server. If he is eligible for voting,
the voter will receive a ballot and will choose one of the two cryptograms. The
voter will submit his selected vote to the server. Next, the server will sign the
received ballot and send it to the voter so he can either accept it and cast it as
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his vote or reveal the content of signed ballot to verify that his selection reflects
his intention.
We are interested in modelling and evaluating the casting stage of the DRE-i
e-voting system which has four main activities: getting the vote cryptograms,
signing the selected cryptogram, casting or verifying the selected vote. From the
server side, these actions are voteCryptogramsReply, signTransReply, voteCas-
tAck, and voteVerifyAck. Figure 1 demonstrates the interactions between the
voting client and voting server to carry out vote casting process.
DRE-i server
DRE-i client
1.1
1.2
2
3.1
3.2
4.14.24.3
4.4
1.1 The DRE-i client sends 
voteCryptogramsReq to the server.
1.2 The server sends 
voteCryptogramsReply to the DRE-i 
client
2  The DRE-i  client selects  a 
cryptogram
3.1 The DRE-i client sends 
signTransReq to the server.
3.2 The server sends signTransReply 
to the DRE-i client
4.1 The DRE-i  client sends 
voteCastMSG to the server.
4.2 The server sends voteCastAck to 
the DRE-i client
4.3 The DRE-i client sends 
voteVerifyMSG to the server.
4.4 The server sends voteVerifyAck to 
the DRE-i client
Fig. 1: Main collaboration between the DRE-i client and server
The legitimate voter will send the following requests: voteCryptogramsReq,
signTransReq, voteCastMSG, and voteVerifyMSG to the server. Respectively,
the server will reply with the following actions: voteCryptogramsReply, sign-
TransReply, voteCastAck, and voteVerifyAck. In the following two paragraphs
we will explain the server and client actions.
3.2 Misbehaving voters
We have also investigated three misbehaviours that may happen to the DRE-i
e-voting system. The first misbehaviour is represented by a rogue client that just
replays voteCryptogramsReq messages to get valid ballots from the DRE-i server.
We call this type of rogue clients as RCA (Rogue Client of type A) voting client
and the steps 1.1 and 1.2 in Fig. 1 show the interactions between the RCA voting
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client and voting server. This behaviour represents an unsuccessful replay attack
where the misbehaving voter tries to request a ballot that has been requested
by a legitimate voter but the voting server replies with error message.
The second misbehaviour is represented by a rogue client that sends requests
voteCryptogramsReq and signTransReq to the DRE-i server. We call this type of
rogue clients as RCB (Rogue Client of type B) voting client and the steps 1.1, 1.2,
2, 3.1, and 3.2 in Fig. 1 show the interactions between the RCB voting client
and voting server. In this type of voter misbehaviours, the voter successfully
replays a ballot request and gets back the vote cryptograms from the server and
then selects a candidate and sends a sign transcript request to the server but
the server replies with an error message.
The third misbehaviour is represented by a rogue client that successfully
sends requests voteCryptogramsReq, signTransReq, voteCastMSG, and voteV-
erifyMSG to the DRE-i server and gets back valid replies. We call this type of
rogue clients as RCC (Rogue Client of type C) voting client and the steps 1.1,
1.2, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Fig. 1 show the interactions between the
RCC voting client and the voting server. In this type of misbehaving voters, the
malicious voter can successfully cast or verify a vote. This type of misbehaviour
can be represented by cross-site scripting (XSS) or Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF) attacks.
3.3 Actions Rates
We consider the rogue clients’ actions to have rates similar to the rates of the
legitimate clients. We assumed that the rogue clients need to wait for one second
(1000 ms) to restart the next intervention. The rogue clients will have different
rates to complete one intervention with the DRE-i system. To have a good esti-
mate for the rates of the server actions in our performance models, we used the
same live experiment in [2] to derive some of the PEPA model rates. Moreover,
we assumed that the rates of client actions to be 0.002 for actions that will be
done by the client software and 0.0002 for actions to be done by the voter.
Table 1: Action Rates for DRE-i client.
Action Rate
voteCryptogramsReq 0.00114
signTransReq 0.00082
voteCastMSG, voteVerifyMSG 0.00087
selectVote, castReply, verifyReply, reselect 0.0002
voteCastingComplete , voteVerificationComplete 0.002
reselectOrEndVotingRate 0.002
wait 0.0000519585
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Table 2: Action Rates for DRE-i server.
Action Rate
voteCryptogramsReply 0.00114
signTransReply 0.00082
voteCastAck, voteVerifyAck 0.00087
3.4 Throughput Analysis of Server Actions
The throughput of an action is defined as the average number of actions com-
pleted by the system during a unit of time (ms) [13]. In PEPA, we can calculate
the average number of jobs waiting to be served by an action in the model.
This number is called the population(mean queue length). Therefore, we can
calculate the average number of valid voters and rogue voters waiting for each
server’s action. The throughput and population of model actions can be derived
by PEPA Eclipse Plug-in immediately after solving the CTMC underlying the
model or the ODE approximation of the CTMC. Because we are interested in
investigating the impact of rogue clients’ intervention in the DRE-i system, we
need to evaluate the goodput and badput of each server action. Goodput of a
server action expresses the throughput dedicated for the average number of le-
gitimate clients waiting to be served by the server action(See formula (1)). The
badput of a server action expresses the throughput dedicated for the average
number of rogue clients waiting to be served by the server action(See formula
(2)).
Goodput = action throughput×
(
number of valid voters
total number of voters
)
(1)
Badput = action throughput×
(
number of rogue voters
total number of voters
)
(2)
4 PEPA Models
We will construct the formal performance models for the typical behaviour of
the DRE-i voting scheme using PEPA formalism similar to the PEPA model
in [2]. However, in this model we will not model the voter behaviour because
we will abstract the voter behaviour inside the voting client. Therefore, in this
model we will have the voting client and the voting server components. Based on
Figure 1 we define the formal performance model for the DRE-i voting scheme
using PEPA language as follows:
4.1 DRE-i Server and Client
The system is composed of 30 DRE-i legitimate clients and one server. The sys-
tem starts by receiving the request voteCryptogramsReq form the DRE-i client
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and subsequently the DRE-i server replies with the action voteCryptogramsRe-
ply . The client and server continue the interactions as shown in the PEPA
description of client and server collaboration below.
Voting client:
DRE_Client0
def
= (voteCryptogramsReq,rvoteCryptogramsReq ).DRE_Client1
DRE_Client1
def
= (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply).DRE_Client2
DRE_Client2
def
= (selectVote,rselectVote ).DRE_Client3
DRE_Client3
def
= (signTranscriptReq,rsignTranscriptReq ).DRE_Client4
DRE_Client4
def
= (signTranscriptReply,rsignTranscriptReply).DRE_Client5
DRE_Client5
def
= (castReply,rcastReply).DRE_Client6 + (verifyReply,rverifyReply).DRE_Client7
DRE_Client6
def
= (castedVoteMSG,rcastedVoteMSG ).DRE_Client8
DRE_Client8
def
= (castedVoteAck,rcastedVoteAck ).
(voteCastingComplete,rvoteCastingComplete ).(wait,rwait ).DRE_Client0
DRE_Client7
def
= (verifiedVoteMSG,rverifiedVoteMSG ).DRE_Client9
DRE_Client9
def
= (verifiedVoteAck,rverifiedVoteAck).
(voteVerificationComplete,rvoteVerificationComplete).DRE_Client10
DRE_Client10
def
= (reselectOrEndVoting,rreselectOrEndVoting ).DRE_Client11
DRE_Client11
def
= (reselect,rreselect).DRE_Client0 +
(endVoting,rendVoting ).(wait,rwait ).DRE_Client0
Voting server:
DRE_SRV0
def
= (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply ).DRE_SRV0 +
(signTranscriptReply,rsignTranscriptReply ).DRE_SRV0 +
(castedVoteAck,rcastedVoteAck).DRE_SRV0 + (verifiedVoteAck,rverifiedVoteAck).DRE_SRV0
System equation:
((DRE_Client0[i ] BCL1 DRE_SRV0[j ]))
where i is the number of voters in the system, j is the number of e-voting servers,
and
L1 =
{
voteCryptogramsReply,signTranscriptReply, castedVoteAck,verifiedVoteAck
}
4.2 RCA DRE-i clients
The DRE-i rouge client of type RCA starts interacting with the system by
sending the request voteCryptogramsReq to the DRE-i server. The server replies
with the action voteCryptogramsReply to end the collaboration and the RCA
DRE-i rogue client goes back to the initial state RCA_DRE_Client0.
RCA Voting client:
RCA_DRE_Client0
def
= (voteCryptogramsReq,rvoteCryptogramsReq ).RCA_DRE_Client1
RCA_DRE_Client1
def
= (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply).RCA_DRE_Client2
RCA_DRE_Client2
def
= (rc_wait,rrc_wait ).RCA_DRE_Client0
System equation:
((DRE_Client0[i ]BC RCA_DRE_Client0[k ] ) BCL1 DRE_SRV0[j ])
where i is the number of voters in the system, j is the number of e-voting
servers, k is the number of RCA clients, and
L1 =
{
voteCryptogramsReply,signTranscriptReply, castedVoteAck,verifiedVoteAck
}
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4.3 RCB DRE-i clients
The DRE-i rouge client of type RCB starts interacting with the system by
sending the request voteCryptogramsReq to the DRE-i server and successfully
receiving the action voteCryptogramsReply from the server . In the next step,
the RCB client select the candidate. Subsequently, the RCB client sends the
request signTranscriptReq to the server and the server replies with the action
signTranscriptReply to end the collaboration and the RCB DRE-i rogue client
goes back to the initial state RCB_DRE_Client0.
RCB Voting client:
RCB_DRE_Client0
def
= (voteCryptogramsReq,rvoteCryptogramsReq ).RCB_DRE_Client1
RCB_DRE_Client1
def
= (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply).RCB_DRE_Client2
RCB_DRE_Client2
def
= (selectVoteReq,rselectVoteReq ).RCB_DRE_Client3
RCB_DRE_Client3
def
= (signTranscriptReq,rsignTranscriptReq ).RCB_DRE_Client4
DRE_Client4
def
= (signTranscriptReply,rsignTranscriptReply).DRE_Client5
RCB_DRE_Client5
def
= (rc_wait,rrc_wait ).RCB_DRE_Client0
System equation:
((DRE_Client0[i ]BC RCB_DRE_Client0[k ] ) BCL1 DRE_SRV0[j ])
where i is the number of voters in the system, j is the number of e-voting
servers, k is the number of RCB clients, and
L1 =
{
voteCryptogramsReply,signTranscriptReply, castedVoteAck,verifiedVoteAck
}
4.4 RCC DRE-i clients
In this type of rogue clients, the RCC DRE-i rouge client suc-
cessfully collaborate with the server through sending the client
actions voteCryptogramsReq , signTransReq, voteCastMSG, and
voteVerifyMSG and receiving the server actions voteCryptogram-
sReply, signTranscriptReply, castedVoteAck, and verifiedVoteAck.
RCC Voting client:
RCC_DRE_Client0
def
= (voteCryptogramsReq,rvoteCryptogramsReq ).RCC_DRE_Client1
RCC_DRE_Client1
def
= (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply).RCC_DRE_Client2
RCC_DRE_Client2
def
= (selectVoteReq,rselectVoteReq ).RCC_DRE_Client3
RCC_DRE_Client3
def
= (signTranscriptReq,rsignTranscriptReq ).RCC_DRE_Client4
DRE_Client4
def
= (signTranscriptReply,rsignTranscriptReply).DRE_Client5
RCC_DRE_Client5
def
= (castReply,rcastReply).RCC_DRE_Client6 +
(verifyReply,rverifyReply ).RCC_DRE_Client7
RCC_DRE_Client6
def
= (castedVoteMSG,rcastedVoteMSG ).RCC_DRE_Client8
RCC_DRE_Client8
def
= (castedVoteAck,rcastedVoteAck ).RCC_DRE_Client9
RCB_DRE_Client9
def
= (voteCastingComplete,rvoteCastingComplete).
(rc_wait,rrc_wait ).RCB_DRE_Client0
RCC_DRE_Client7
def
= (verifiedVoteMSG,rverifiedVoteMSG ).RCC_DRE_Client10
RCC_DRE_Client10
def
= (verifiedVoteAck,rverifiedVoteAck).RCC_DRE_Client11
RCC_DRE_Client11
def
= (voteVerificationComplete,rvoteVerificationComplete).
(rc_wait,rrc_wait ).RCB_DRE_Client0
System equation:
((DRE_Client0[i ]BC RCC_DRE_Client0[k ] ) BCL1 DRE_SRV0[j ])
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where i is the number of voters in the system, j is the number of e-voting
servers, k is the number of RCC clients, and
L1 =
{
voteCryptogramsReply,signTranscriptReply, castedVoteAck,verifiedVoteAck
}
5 Results and Discussion
After constructing and testing the performance models using the PEPA Eclipse
Plug-in tool, we used the ordinary differential equations technique [14] of the
tool to evaluate the effect of the intervention of rogue clients on the DRE-i e-
voting system. We evaluated the goodput and badput of the server actions for
the three types of rogue clients.
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Fig. 2: Throughput for server actions.
First, we investigated the impact of the misbehaving voters on the DRE-i
system that had one DRE-i server, thirty legitimate clients, and a varying num-
ber of rogue clients. The goodput and badput were analysed. Later, we fixed
the number of rogue clients to be 100, the legitimate clients (LC) to be 30, and
varied the number of DRE-i servers from one to eight. Before starting the evalu-
ation of the impact of the misbehaving voters’ intervention on the performance
of the system, we evaluated the throughput of the system. The system had one
server, a varying number of legitimate clients, and no rogue clients. We found
out that the server action signTranscriptReply had reached its maximum rate of
0.000820 when there were 30 legitimate clients in the system. As a result, the
castedVoteAck and verifiedVoteAck reached a maximum throughput of 0.000656
and 0.000164, and voteCryptogramsReply reached a maximum throughput of
0.000820 (See Fig. 2 ). Therefore, we used this configuration, the one server
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and 30 legitimate clients, to evaluate the impact of the intervention of the three
types of the misbehaving voters on the good throughput of the DRE-i system.
5.1 Goodput of Server Actions
In this section, we will show the effect of the three types of interventions of the
misbehaving voters when they interact with one DRE-i server. Each intervention
type has a different rate to complete one intervention with the DRE-i server.
RCA will have the highest rate to complete one intervention, RCB will have a
lower rate, and RCC will have the lowest rate.
Impact of RCA Intervention In the PEPA model of RCA, the rogue client
will replay the request voteCryptogramsReq and wait for a reply from the server.
The server will receive the request and reply with voteCryptogramsReply to end
the interactions between the rouge client and the server. The impact of vote-
CryptogramsReq requests sent by rogue client of type RCA on the throughput
of the DRE-i server actions is demonstrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The voteCryp-
togramsReply action has a maximum rate of 0.00114. The RCA clients make the
voteCryptogramsReply action reach that maximum because RCA clients do not
go through the signTranscriptReply action. The badput figure shows the increase
of the server action throughput used by rogue clients when we gradually increase
the number of rogue clients. Consequently, the goodput figure reveals that the
more we add rogue clients to the system the less throughput will be dedicated
for legitimate clients.
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Fig. 3: Goodput for server actions.
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Fig. 4: Badput for server actions.
Impact of RCB Behaviour The impact of voteCryptogramsReq and signTran-
scriptReq requests sent by rogue client of type RCB on the throughput of the
DRE-i server actions is demonstrated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. In this intervention
12 M. Alotaibi and N. Thomas
type, the rogue client needs to go through the server action signTranscriptRe-
ply which has the minimum rate among the rates of the server’s actions. The
rate of the server’s action signTranscriptReply will slow down the intervention
rate of RCB compared to the intervention rate of RCA. This explains why the
voteCryptogramsReply action will not exceed the rate of 0.00082.
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Fig. 5: Goodput for server actions.
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Fig. 6: Badput for server actions.
The badput and goodput in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that the increase in the
number of rogue clients in the system increases the badput of the server’s actions.
Consequently, this will make goodput of the server’s actions decrease.
Impact of RCC Behaviour The impact of the badput of the RCC rogue
client is shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.
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Fig. 7: Goodput for server actions.
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The badput and goodput of server actions’ voteCryptogramsReply and sign-
TranscriptReply in this type of intervention are similar to those in the RCB
intervention because both RCB and RCC rogue clients need to go through the
server action signTranscriptReply.
5.2 Scalability of Server’s Goodput
After investigating the impact of the three types of the illegitimate interventions
on one server, we have studied the goodput of server actions when there are
more than one server. As shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, the throughputs of the
server actions voteCryyptogramReply and castedVoteAck are fixed at 0.0082 and
0.00065 when the system has 30 legitimate clients and varying number of servers.
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Fig. 9: Goodput for voteCryptogramsRe-
ply. LC=30, RCA=100, RCB=100, and
RCC=100.
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Fig. 10: Goodput for castedVoteAck.
LC=30, RCA=100, RCB=100, and
RCC=100.
The throughput for the two server’s actions do not increase when we add
more servers. The rate of 0.0082 for the action signTranscriptReply (one server)
is enough to provide the 30 legitimate clients with required resources. In the case
when there are one or two servers in the DRE-i system, the goodput of the server
action voteCryyptogramReply when the system interacts with 100 RCA clients
is better than the goodput of the server action voteCryyptogramReply when the
system interacts with 100 RCC clients. However, when there are five servers, we
notice the contrary. This is because the RCA rogue client has a higher intensity
of actions with the DRE-i server than the RCB or RCC rogue client has. The
RCB and RCC rogue clients face a bottleneck at the server’s action signTran-
scriptReply when they interact with the system. However, when we increase the
number of servers, we alleviate the bottleneck in the action signTranscriptReply.
Therefore, the rogue clients RCB and RCC, and the 30 legitimate clients get
more throughput from the server’s action signTranscriptReply. So, the DRE-i
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system starts having a better goodput when it has interventions from RCB or
RCC rogue clients compared to the goodput it will have when it has interventions
from RCA. Moreover, the evaluation of the performance models of the DRE-i
system with misbehaving voters shows that adding more servers (up to seven
servers) do not make the goodput of the servers’ actions reaches the throughput
of the DRE-i servers when the system has no misbehaving voters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, by using PEPA, we presented the performance models of three
misbehaving voters when using the large scale and secure DRE-i e-voting sys-
tem. The constructed performance models captured the high-level interactions
between the DRE-i e-voting system, the valid voters, and the misbehaving vot-
ers. The evaluation of throughput of the main DRE-i server’s actions clearly
shows the impact of the interaction of misbehaving voters with the e-voting sys-
tem. The goodput of server actions went down when added more rogue clients
to the system.
The evaluation of the effect of misbehaving voters on the DRE-i e-voting
system can be extended to include the analysis of the response time that will
be observed by legitimate voters when they cast their votes. Furthermore, the
countermeasures to reduce the effect of misbehaving voters on the performance
of the DRE-i voting system is an interesting area to be investigated using the
formal performance formalism like PEPA.
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